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TRIGGERING THE LIABILITY INSURER'S
DUTY TO DEFEND IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROCEEDINGS: DOES POTENTIALLY
RESPONSIBLE PARTY NOTIFICATION
CONSTITUTE A "SUIT"?
One of the most distressing results of legislative efforts to rem-
edy the nation's hazardous waste problem1 has been the enormous
amount of collateral litigation between liability insurers and their
insured polluters. Typically, this litigation has focused on the
' See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), amended by, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (primary federal hazardous waste
cleanup legislation); see also DANIEL P. SELMh & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 7.05 (1991) (describing analogous state statutes). See generally 4 WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 8.1-.2 (1992) (discussing background and fundamen-
tal features of CERCLA and SARA).
The CERCLA scheme, also known as "Superfund," is designed to effect cleanup of haz-
ardous waste by empowering the government, currently through the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to identify hazardous waste sites and to pursue reme-
dial activities. See id. § 8.1, at 475-78. The government may itself perform the remediation
and then seek compensation from the parties responsible for the pollution, or have the pol-
luters themselves complete the necessary cleanup work. See infra notes 11-14.
The EPA compiles the nation's worst hazardous waste sites on the National Priorities
List ("NPL"). See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988) (statutory authorization); National Pri-
orities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,179, 47,187-203 (1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B) (current list). See generally 4 RODGERS, supra,
§ 8.7, at 573-77 (discussing use and scope of NPL). The most recent version of the NPL
included over 1,200 general Superfund and federal facilities sites. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,179,
47,187-203 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B). This is, however, only a
fraction of the total number of sites known or believed to exist throughout the country. See
Insurer Liability for Cleanup Costs of Hazardous Waste Sites, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Policy Research and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of James
M. Strock, EPA) (noting that almost 33,000 sites are contained in EPA's CERCLA Informa-
tion System ("CERCLIS") inventory of potential cleanup sites); id. at 14 (testimony of
Lawrence Dyckman, General Accounting Office) ("[The potential universe of hazardous
waste sites in the United States could be anywhere from 130,000 to 425,000 sites."). The
cost of the nation's hazardous waste cleanup could be as high as $700 billion. See id.
2 See generally John F. Appelquist, Comment, Liability Insurance Coverage for
Superfund Claims: A Modest Proposal, 53 Mo. L. REv. 289, 289-90 (1988) (noting "veritable
tidal wave" of environmental cleanup litigation and consequent liability insurance claims
filed by potentially responsible insureds); Kirk A. Pasich, The Breadth of Insurance Cover-
age for Environmental Claims, 52 OHio ST. L.J. 1131, 1131-32 (1991) (same); Carl A. Sails-
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terms and construction of comprehensive general liability ("CGL")
policies, 3 primarily on the scope of the indemnity provided.4 How-
ever, litigation has also centered on the extent of the insurers'
other primary obligation-the duty to defend.5
The language of the CGL duty to defend clause requires the
insurer to defend the insured in "any suit" purportedly covered by
the policy.6 An insurer's obligations7 and liabilities' regarding its
bury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and
the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVTL. L. 357, 358-59
(1991) (same).
I See James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d
273, 278 (Ky. 1991). The court gave an overview of the CGL policy:
The primary purpose of a comprehensive general liability policy is to provide
broad comprehensive insurance. Obviously the very name of the policy suggests
the expectation of maximum coverage. Consequently the comprehensive policy
has been one of the most preferred by businesses and governmental entities over
the years because the policy has provided the broadest coverage available. All
risks not expressly excluded are covered, including those not contemplated by ei-
ther party.
Id.; see also Salisbury, supra note 2, at 359 n.6 (discussing principal elements of CGL
policies).
CGL policies began to appear in the 1940s as a broad-based replacement for the specific
risk policies that preceded them. Pasich, supra note 2, at 1132. The drafting of CGL policies
was conducted by insurance industry trade organizations resulting in standard forms in
1941, 1947, 1955, 1966, and 1973. Salisbury, supra note 2, at 363. Instead of limiting cover-
age to "accidents," as in previous versions, the 1966 standard form provided coverage for
any "occurrence," which it defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to condi-
tion, which results, [in injuries or damages] . . .neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured." Id. (emphasis added). At the time of the revisions, the insurance
industry explained that coverage was being expanded and would include pollution claims.
See id. at 364-68. As an update, it should be noted that the insurance industry responded to
the current wave of litigation in 1986 by drafting a stricter CGL standard form. See Joel R.
Mosher, Insurance Issues in Hazardous Waste Cases, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 881, 883, 893
(1989) (explaining that current CGL standard form contains stricter duty to defend clause
and absolute pollution exclusion).
See, e.g., Pasich, supra note 2, at 1137. One of the issues commonly raised in environ-
mental coverage litigation is whether cleanup costs incurred by the insured are "damages"
within the meaning of a CGL policy and thus indemnifiable. Id. ("More than 100 courts ...
have decided this issue nationally."). Another common dispute concerns the applicability of
the pollution exclusion to preclude coverage. See Salisbury, supra note 2, at 393-400 (survey
of pollution exclusion cases).
I See ALLEN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4.01, at 128-29 (2d ed. 1988)
("[M]ost liability policies provide that the insurance company has . . .the obligation to
-defend the insured."). See generally James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to
Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance Into Litigation
Insurance, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 141, 141-45 (1991) (describing the CGL insurer's duty to
defend).
0 See Donald E. Sharpe & Jean K. Shaffer, The Parameters of an Insurer's Duty to
Defend, 19 FORUM 555, 556 (1984). The 1973 standard CGL policy provides that "the com-
pany shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages
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duty to defend are fairly well-established. However, the applicabil-
ity of the term "suit" to pre-litigation or administrative proceed-
ings is not so easily resolved,9 particularly as to proceedings con-
ducted pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").10
on account of such [covered] bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent." Id.
' See Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., 693 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The pri-
mary consideration in evaluating an insurer's duty to defend is whether the pleadings allege
a claim within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy."), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
818 (1983). "It is generally recognized that as long as there is 'potential' coverage of the
claim, the insurer must defend the interests of the insured." 1 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 5A:3, at 526 (6th ed. 1990). Furthermore, the duty to defend is
triggered so long as any part of the allegations are covered. See WINDT, supra note 5, § 4.01
at 129-30.
Ordinarily, upon service of process, the insured has a duty to forward to the insurer any
complaint or other legal documents so that the insurer may promptly make a coverage de-
termination and proceed accordingly. See 14 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 51:123, at 629-30 (Mark S. Rhodes rev. ed. 1982). If the insurer determines the claim to be
potentially within the policy coverage, the duty to provide a defense is triggered. See
WINDT, supra note 5, § 2.06, at 32. Such a defense should be conducted subject to a reserva-
tion of rights to later contest coverage. Id. Alternatively of course, the insurer may simply
deny coverage outright and consequently not proffer any defense. Id. at 33.
8 See generally 14 COUCH, supra note 7, § 51:54-:77 (discussing unjustified refusal to
defend). If the insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend, it will be liable for any "judgment
rendered against the insured, or ... any settlement made in good faith by the insured." Id.
§ 51:58, at 525. These damages are usually capped by the policy limits since that is the
insured's maximum expectancy. Id. § 51:59, at 530.
In contrast, damages for breach of the insurer's duty to defend ntay include "all the
expenses [the insured] incurred in making [its] defense." Id. § 51:60, at 531 (emphasis
added). Since the insurer may include defense costs in policy limits, the absence of such a
provision requires the insurer to assume responsibility for all costs. See also WINDT, supra
note 5, at 200-02. Good faith is not a defense for the insurer. See 14 COUCH, supra note 7,
§ 51:54, at 509 ("[Sluch a refusal [to defend], even though based on an honest mistake of
the insurer, constitutes an unjustified refusal."); see also WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.38 (dis-
cussing tortious "bad faith" denial of coverage and penalties imposed on insurers).
I See WINDT, supra note 5, § 2.07, at 33 ("A question arises, however, as to what the
insurer's responsibilities are if it is notified of an occurrence before any lawsuit is filed."
(emphasis supplied)). The traditional rule is that "merely asserting a demand against an
insured [is] not sufficient to 'trigger' the duty to defend; instead, the obligation attaches
only when an actual lawsuit [is] filed." 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, § 5A:4, at 532.
Insofar as it includes only formal lawsuits, the traditional rule has been criticized as
unnecessary "hairsplitting." Id. § 5A:4, at 533. It has also been suggested that the duty to
defend trigger should be measured by the insurer's ability to make a coverage determination
rather than the form of the legal proceeding pending against the insured. See WINDT, supra
note 5, § 2.07, at 33; see also id. § 4.12, at 159 n.108 (asserting that "'suits'... should be
held to encompass adjudicatory proceedings before an administrative agency").
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988 & Supp. 1992); see Mosher, supra note 3, at 833-34
(noting split in courts deciding whether EPA pre-suit notification to insured constituted
"suit"); Jeffrey L. Fillerup, An Update of Duty to Defend Cases in the Context of Environ-
1993]
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While the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") may under CERCLA bring a cost recovery suit,11 or a suit
for injunctive relief, 2 the CERCLA scheme emphasizes the per-
formance of a prompt cleanup, for which the government may look
to the responsible polluters.' s The instrumentality by which pol-
luters are first involved in the cleanup process' 4 is known as a "po-
mental Claims, in ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS AND LITIGATION 235 (PLI
Com. L. and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 622, 1992) (available in Westlaw, at *7-*9)
(same).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). CERCLA imposes strict liability on present and past
owners and operators of hazardous waste sites, as well as generators and transporters of
hazardous waste. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4). This liability provides for recovery of costs incurred by
the government to cleanup the site, §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B), in addition to damages for injury
to natural resources, § 9607(a)(4)(C), and health assessment costs, § 9607(a)(4)(D). See also
§ 9613 (civil proceedings).
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Where a hazardous waste release creates "an immi-
nent and substantial" danger, "such relief as may be necessary" to abate the danger may be
granted by a United States district court. Id.
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9622(a) (1988). If there is substantial risk created by a
hazardous substance release, the government is authorized to take such "response mea-
sure[s]" as are necessary. § 9604(a)(1). Toward this end, the government may allow a "re-
sponsible party," see supra note 11, to execute the cleanup if it is determined that it would
be "done properly and promptly." § 9604(a)(1). Additionally, § 122 of CERCLA advances
the execution of prompt cleanup by authorizing the EPA to enter into settlements with
responsible parties. See § 9622(a). Section 122 expressly asserts CERCLA's "anti-litigation"
policy by providing that "[w]henever practicable . . . [EPA] shall act to facilitate [settle-
ment] agreements ... in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litiga-
tion." Id. It should be readily acknowledged that the EPA "prefers [responsible parties] to
undertake response actions rather than doing so itself [since t]his saves... [the] EPA from
spending money to clean up sites and then spending additional money to sue [responsible
parties] for the costs of cleanup." Andrew H. Perellis & Mary E. Doohan, Superfund Litiga-
tion: The Elements and Scope of Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1, 4 (Janet S.
Kole & Larry D. Espel eds., 1991).
14 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400 to .440 (1992) (Hazardous Substance Response); Perellis &
Doohan, supra note 13, at 5-6.
After preliminary assessment of the site has determined the need for response, 40
C.F.R. § 300.420, the next step in the cleanup process is a "remedial investigation"
("RI")-a "detailed technical study designed to determine the exact extent of contamina-
tion at the site." Perellis & Doohan, supra note 13, at 5-6. "The RI is followed by an engi-
neering analysis of technologically available alternatives that might be employed to clean up
the contamination, and is known as a feasibility study ("FS")." Id. at 6. Once these studies
are completed, the EPA will set forth the remedial action to be conducted in a formal Rec-
ord of Decision. Id. In connection with these measures, the EPA must establish an "admin-
istrative record," 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(1) (1988), and provide for public participation. Id.
§ 9613(k)(2)(B).
It should be recognized that a CERCLA cleanup ordinarily takes years to com-
plete--"[t]he RI/FS process may take three years alone." Perellis & Doohan, supra note 13,
at 6. In fact, "[a]s of September 1990, only 5 percent of... [the EPA's] high-priority [sites]
had been cleaned up." Don J. DeBenedictis, How Superfund Money Is Spent, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1992, at 30. Cleanup at some of the nation's worst hazardous waste sites has only re-
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tentially responsible party" (PRP) letter.'5 At this point, assuming
cently been completed. See $52 Million Cleanup, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 6 (reporting
finalization of work at Lipari and Helen Kramer landfills, respectively nos. 1 and 4 on
NPL).
15 See generally Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and Information
Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg. 5298-308 (EPA 1988) (setting forth guidelines for general and spe-
cial notice letters, and other PRP communications). Notice letters are one of the primary
methods by which EPA and PRPs communicate and interact, leading to voluntary settle-
ments, one of CERCLA's fundamental goals. Id. at 5298-99. Special notice letters are used
prior to commencement of an RI/FS or remedial action, see supra note 14, as a method of
concluding negotiations and seeking "good faith offer[s]" from PRPs to complete required
work. 53 Fed. Reg. at 5301-02. In comparison, a general notice letter is utilized "to inform
PRPs of their potential liability for future response costs, to begin or continue the process
of information exchange, and to initiate the process of 'informal negotiations.'" Id. at 5300.
A general notice letter is commonly the first formal contact the EPA has with PRPs and is
sent "as early in the process as possible . . . [in order to] ensure that PRPs have adequate
knowledge of their potential liability as well as a realistic opportunity to participate in set-
tlement negotiations." Id. at 5301.
The PRP, by a general notice letter, is given notice of potential liability as follows:
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has documented
the release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contami-
nation at the above-referenced site. EPA has spent, or is considering spending,
public funds on actions to investigate and control such releases or threatened re-
leases at the site. Unless EPA reaches an agreement under which a potentially
liable party or parties will properly perform or finance such actions, EPA may
perform these actions pursuant to Section 104 of CERCLA.
Under Sections 106(a) and 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. Sections 9606(a)
and 9607(a). ... and other laws, potentially liable parties may be ordered to per-
form response actions deemed necessary by EPA to protect the public health, wel-
fare or the environment, and may be liable for all costs incurred by the govern-
ment in responding to any release or threatened release at the site. Such actions
and costs may include, but are not limited to, expenditures for conducting a Re-
medial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS), conducting a Remedial Design/
Remedial Action (RD/RA), and other investigation, planning, response, oversight,
and enforcement activities. In addition, potentially liable parties may be required
to pay for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the cost of assessing such damages.
EPA has evaluated information in connection with the investigation of the
site. Based on this information, EPA believes that you may be a potentially re-
sponsible party (PRP) with respect to this site. Potentially responsible parties
under CERCLA include current and former owners and operators of the site as
well as persons who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances
sent to the site, or persons who accepted hazardous substances for transport to the
site. By this letter, EPA notifies you of your potential liability with regard to this
matter and encourages you to voluntarily perform or finance those response activi-
ties that EPA determines are necessary at the site.
In accordance with CERCLA and other authorities, EPA has already under-
taken certain actions and incurred certain costs in response to conditions at the
site. These response actions include... EPA may expend additional funds for
response activities at the site under the authority of CERCLA and other laws.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTErION AGENCY, MODEL GENERAL NOTICE LEmER
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the PRP becomes involved,16 the PRP needs immediate legal rep-
resentation for negotiations with not only the EPA,17 but other
PRPs as well.18
Faced with protracted involvement in a CERCLA cleanup,
and its corresponding high costs,19 PRPs have looked to their CGL
insurers for performance of the duty to defend.20 Arguing that a
PRP letter does not constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the
CGL duty to defend clause, some insurers have refused to provide
PRPs with representation.2 1 Notably, insurers risk little by chal-
lenging the timing of their duty to defend, as opposed to its exis-
tence, because they a) appear to escape the penalties of an errone-
(1989) (on file with ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW, along with other model notice letters). The
general notice letter may also inform the PRP of future special notice, activities taken or
planned, other PRPs, and might request information from the PRP. See id.
1" See Perellis & Doohan, supra note 13, at 4. While a PRP may of course ignore the
government's notification and take its chances in a cost recovery action, it is more likely
that PRPs will cooperate since "PRPs can perform the desired investigatory studies at less
cost." Id. "[B]etter control [of] the decision-making process of selecting the remedy" is also
something to be sought by PRPs since "remediation cost[s] can vary widely depending on
the remedy selected." Id.
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988); supra note 13.
18 See Perellis & Doohan, supra note 13, at 4-5. Certain types of hazardous waste sites,
for instance, landfills, may involve hundreds of PRPs. Id. Such numbers do not negate the
premise that PRPs are better suited to complete the cleanup, see supra notes 13, 16, but
rather create the necessity for agreements between the PRPs. Perellis & Doohan, supra note
14, at 4. Within the scope of these agreements, a major problem is the allocation of costs. Id.
at 5. Although factors such as "volumetric contribution" or "toxicity of waste" can be uti-
lized to fairly calculate each PRP's share, gaps and disparities in the records of the parties
prevent a truly objective apportionment. Id.
10 See Perellis & Doohan, supra note 13, at 6 ("The average cost of a Superfund site
cleanup is probably between $20 and $40 million."); see also DeBenedictis, supra note 14, at
30 (noting insurers spent approximately $200 million in 1989 "defending PRPs from claims
by the EPA and other PRPs").
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1318 & 1340 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (two orders accepting magistrate's reports) [hereinafter Ex-Cell-O III], the court de-
termined that certain cleanup costs were reimbursable as defense costs. Significantly, the
court held that costs incurred for consultants and scientific studies could be reimbursable as
defense costs. Id. at 1321. "Defense costs include not only those reasonable and necessary to
defeat or limit liability, but also those costs, including consulting fees, that are reasonable
and necessary to limit the scope and/or costs of remediation, even if similar or identical
studies have been ordered by the government." Id. Also included in defense costs were
"[l]egal services undertaken to determine and evaluate how other entities on other sites
negotiated and resolved issues" similar to the instant dispute. Id. at 1342.
20 See Pasich, supra note 2, at 1131-32; Appelquist, supra note 2, at 289-90.
21 See, e.g., Arco Indus. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mich.
1989) ("[Tlhe insurers argue that the PRP letter does not trigger their duty to defend be-
cause they are only obligated to defend [the insured] against 'suits' and the PRP letter is
not a suit.").
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ous coverage determination,22 b) may avoid the duty to defend
altogether based on a subsequently favorable coverage declara-
tion,23 and c) at worst would merely have to pay defense costs ret-
roactively.24 In response to these challenges, the courts have split
over the issue whether a PRP letter constitutes a "suit" triggering
the insurer's duty to defend.25
This Note attempts to resolve this controversy by analyzing
the various rationales applied by the courts and determining which
approach better effectuates CERCLA's ultimate goal of a clean en-
vironment. Part One assesses the pro-insurer cases which delay
triggering the duty to defend. Most of these cases rely on the
"clear and unambiguous" rule of policy construction2 1 to justify
their narrow reading of the subject policies. Part Two evaluates the
pro-insured cases. The theories upon which these courts rely in-
clude the unreasonable results exception to the clear and unambig-
uous rule and the reasonable expectations doctrine. Part Three
analyzes the policy considerations associated with including insur-
ers in the cleanup process. In conclusion, this Note suggests that
the pro-insurer position is more appropriate as a matter of law and
further that the consequences of a pro-insurer rule are more likely
to advance CERCLA's goals.
22 See supra note 8 (describing insurer's liability for unjustified refusal to defend).
22 See supra note 7 (discussing when duty to defend exists). The duty to defend would
not exist in the case of a declaratory judgment of non-coverage since a claim must be at
least potentially covered for the duty to defend to be triggered. Id.
24 See Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 447
(N.D. Ohio 1987) ("[D]efense costs ... expended by [the insured] in developing the admin-
istrative record would then become reimbursable by [the insurer], once the EPA action is
filed.").
22 Compare Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding PRP letter does not trigger duty to defend) ivith Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding PRP letter does trigger duty to
defend). Compare Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 742 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
state environmental agency notification does not trigger duty to defend) with Avondale In-
dus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding state notifica-
tion does trigger duty to defend), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). See also infra notes 27-
98 & accompanying text (discussing cases evincing almost equal division of federal and state
courts).
2' See 2 CoucH, supra note 7, § 15:4 at 122 ("[W]here the policy language is clear and
unambiguous the court must enforce it as written .... ).
1993]
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I. PRO-INSURER CASES-DUTY. TO DEFEND NOT TRIGGERED BY
PRP LETTER
A. Plain and Ordinary Meaning
While the pro-insurer cases are not in agreement on all mat-
ters,27 they generally commence with an application of the "clear
and unambiguous" rule of policy construction.28 Basically, the rule
provides that "[i]f the language... is plain and susceptible of but
one meaning,... that language will control....
The initial step necessitated by this rule is to determine
whether an ambiguity exists, as measured by the understanding of
"a reasonably prudent person."30 In order to establish the proper
27 Compare Arco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 66 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("In plain
language, ['suit'] refers to court proceedings.") with Ryan, 916 F.2d at 741 (creating test for
"suit" measuring "coerciveness, adversariness, the seriousness of the effort with which the
government hounds an insured, and the gravity of imminent consequences"). Compare Pa-
trons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 20 (Me. 1990) (holding that suit seeking
injunctive relief did not trigger duty to defend) with Detrex Chem., 681 F. Supp. at 445-46
(indicating that § 9606 injunctive action would trigger duty to defend).
28 See, e.g., Arco, 730 F. Supp. at 66 ("If the policy language is clear and unequivocal..
its terms must be enforced; the courts will not rewrite the contract.") (quoting Usher v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 337 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)); Detrex Chem.,
681 F. Supp. at 442 ("The court examines the policy provisions mindful that 'where the
meaning of the writing is clear and unambiguous upon its face, the words therein are to be
understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense.' ") (quoting United States Fidelity &
Guar. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34, 37 (1930)); cf. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d at 1516 (pro-insured
case) ("[A] court looks to the plain meaning of the policy language.").
29 2 COUCH, supra note 7, § 15:10, at 151-52. See generally id. §§ 15:1-:24 (standards of
policy construction); WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02 (same). The clear and unambiguous rule
of policy construction is necessary to give effect to basic contract principles whereby parties
are bound by their intentions as objectively manifested. See 2 CoucH, supra note 7, § 15:9,
at 146; see also 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 538 (1951) (discussing objec-
tive theory of contract interpretation). Therefore, where the policy language is clear, that
language should be taken as accurately representing the parties intentions and so govern
their relationship without rewriting by the court. See 2 COUCH, supra note 7, § 15:4, at 122-
23.
The "clear and unambiguous" rule is not, however, without caveat: an "unreasonable or
absurd result" will vitiate the court's duty to impose a literal interpretation of the unambig-
uous language. See id. § 15:10, at 151-52; WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02, at 279-80. Moreover,
the notion that any ambiguity should be construed against the insurer as drafter of the
policy, known as contra proferentum, is well established. See WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02,
at 281-87 (but criticizing per se application of rule resulting in coverage neither expected
nor intended by either party). Nevertheless, "[t]he most basic rule in construing insurance
contracts is that policy language should be given its popular and ordinary meaning, unless it
is apparent from a reading of the whole instrument that a different or special meaning was
intended." Id. § 6.02, at 279.
20 2 COUCH, supra note 7, § 15:84, at 416; see also WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02, at 288-
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scope of this understanding, some courts have reviewed common
dictionaries 31 or considered well-established meanings.3 2 Based on
such evidence, these courts have found the term "suit" to unam-
biguously refer to "some type of court proceeding. '33 These courts
have therefore held that a mere PRP letter does not constitute a
"suit" triggering the duty to defend. 4
89 ("[A]n ambiguity arises if the language used is susceptible of more than one meaning to a
reasonably prudent layperson.").
A question arises as to whether the large commercial entities frequently involved in
environmental insurance disputes should be treated as ordinary persons. See Eugene R. An-
derson et al., Policyholder Claims for Insurance Coverage Because of Environmental Dam-
ages, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 427, 513-22 (ALI-ABA 1989) (discussing "sophisti-
cated policyholder" exception to contra proferentum rule). Courts recognizing the exception
have in large part based their departure from the general rule on the particular insured's
role in the negotiation or drafting of the policy. See Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 783 F.
Supp. 1222, 1231 (D. Ariz. 1991); McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525,
547 (D.N.J. 1986), afl'd, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987); American Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1504 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as modified, 748 F.2d 760
(2d Cir. 1984). Absent a showing of such extrinsic evidence, however, courts interpreting
standard form language have generally adhered to the contra proferentum principle without
distinguishing the type of policyholder. See Anderson et al., supra, at 515-22.
31 See Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1198-99 n.10 (W.D.
Mich. 1990). The court enumerated various lay and legal dictionary definitions of the word
"suit":
An action or a process in a court for the recovery of a right or claim .... Action to
secure justice in a court of law; attempt to recover a right or claim through legal
action .... A proceeding in a court of law or chancery, in which a Plaintiff de-
mands the recovery of a right or the redress of a wrong .... Any Proceeding in
court to recover a right or claim .... Case in a court of law; application to a court
of justice .... [A] generic term, of comprehensive signification, referring to any
proceedings by one person or persons against another or others in a court of jus-
tice in which the Plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords
him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right.
Id. (alteration in original); see also Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754,
761 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting dictionary definitions); Detrex Chem., 681 F. Supp. at 442 n.4
(same).
'2 See Arco, 730 F. Supp at 66 ("While the contracts do not define the term 'suit,' the
term has a well-accepted ordinary meaning. In plain language, the term refers to court pro-
ceedings."); Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
("The Court finds that a 'suit' in this context plainly means some type of court proceed-
ings."); Central Quality Serv. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 87-CV-74473-DT, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *22-*23 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1989) (finding no ambiguity in the
term "suit" and giving it "plain and ordinary" meaning), aff'd, No. 90-1991, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27911 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992).
" See Harter, 713 F. Supp. at 233.
14 See Ray Indus., 974 F.2d at 764; Upjohn, 768 F. Supp. at 1199; Arco, 730 F. Supp. at
68; Harter, 713 F. Supp. at 233; Central Quality Serv., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *23;
see also Hi-Mill Mfg. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 90-72494 (6th Cir. Mar. 18,
1993) (unpublished disposition available in WESTLAW) (following Ray Indus., refusing to
certify PRP letter as "suit" issue to Michigan Supreme Court). At the PRP letter stage,
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Additional support for a narrow definition of the term "suit"
is found in the distinct uses of the terms "claim" and "suit" within
the CGL policy language.3 5 The general rule of construction is that
all policy language should be given effect.36 This rule would be con-
troverted were the court to construe the term "suit" to include
"claims" in the face of policy language distinguishing the two
terms, 7 since such an incorporation would render the distinction
superfluous.38
B. "Suit Seeking Damages"
Two courts have taken an even narrower view of the duty to
defend trigger by focusing their analyses on the phrase "suit
against the insured seeking damages," rather than just the term
"suit."3 9 In Patrons Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marois,4 0 the
court held that an administrative order directing the insured to
take remedial action did not trigger the insurer's duty to defend.41
While noting the term "suit" itself might arguably include pro-
"nothing has occurred... that resembles either a lawsuit or a formal administrative adjudi-
cation in any meaningful fashion," thus there is no "suit" by which to trigger the duty to
defend. Upjohn, 768 F. Supp. at 1199. The lack of an actual suit, even if resulting from an
EPA covenant not to sue, see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1988), is sufficient to meet this non-
trigger standard. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp.
1199, 1206 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("Since no suit was filed, no duty to defend arose on the part of
the [insurer]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
3' See Sharpe & Shaffer, supra note 6, at 556. The standard CGL policy gives the in-
surer "the right and duty to defend any suit," and the option to "make such investigation
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient." Id. (emphasis added).
"' WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02, at 280.
3" See Ray Indus., 974 F.2d at 762. The court found the terms "suit" and "claim" to
have been accorded different meanings in the policy language, since only the term "suit"
was used to describe the extent of the duty to defend, whereas the scope of the duty to
investigate was inclusive of "suits" and something more, "claims." Id.
11 Id.; see also Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp.
438, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (distinguishing between claim and suit).
" See A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 293, 306 (D. Mass.
1990) (focusing on damages, as opposed to cleanup costs, as required element of "suit" suffi-
cient to trigger duty to defend), aff'd 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991); Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 20 (Me. 1990) ("Thus, there has been no 'suit against the insured
seeking damages,' and the insurer has no present duty to defend.").
"0 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
41 Id. at 20 (distinguishing action for damages which would trigger duty to defend and
non-triggering cleanup order). Contra Detrex Chem., 681 F. Supp. at 446 (indicating that
injunctive action would trigger duty to defend); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that action seeking equitable rem-
edy was "suit" for purposes of duty to defend).
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ceedings leading to injunctive relief,42 the court concluded that the
pertinent language, "suit against the insured seeking damages,
43
precluded such an interpretation because damages are not an ele-
ment of injunctive relief.44
When applied in a jurisdiction where cleanup costs do not
constitute damages, 46 the "suit seeking damages" rationale will al-
low insurers to avoid providing a defense even in cost recovery ac-
tions, as illustrated by A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.46 The Johnson court held that a suit seeking response
costs was not one seeking damages, but indicated that had the
complaint alleged damage to a natural resource it would have been
a suit seeking damages within the meaning of the CGL policy. 47
C. Intermediate Approaches
Other approaches, focusing on the nature of the proceeding
rather than its technical form, were developed by the courts in De-
trex Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau4s and Ryan v. Royal Insurance Co. of America.49 In De-
trex Chemical, the court decided that the issue was whether the
proceeding in question could cause the insured to become legally
42 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (describing cases construing "suit" as
legal proceedings). But see Ray Indus., 974 F.2d at 761 ("We reject any attempt to allow
phrases that appear in the definitions of 'suit' such as 'legal process,' to expand this term
beyond its traditional meaning to include ... administrative orders .....
'3 Patrons Oxford, 573 A.2d at 20.
44 Id. The court stated that because neither the state nor effected third parties made
claims seeking actual money damages, there was no "suit ... seeking damages." Id. The
state could have sought indemnification for any monetary outlay it may have incurred in
abating the pollution and third parties who suffered from the migration of contaminated
groundwater could have brought suit for reimbursement. Id.
45 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1340, 1346-48 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (Ex-Cell-O II) (citing cases illustrating split among courts as to whether
cleanup costs constitute damages); Lonnie A. Jones, Comment, Insurance Coverage for Haz-
ardous Waste Cleanup: The Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy Defined, 39
CATH. U. L. REv. 195, 204-10 (1989) (discussing cases holding that cleanup costs do not
constitute damages).
'I 741 F. Supp. 298, 306 (D. Mass 1990) (holding duty to defend not triggered since
cleanup costs sought from insured did not constitute damages under Maine law), afl'd, 933
F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991).
47 See id. at 305-06. Under CERCLA, such a pleading requirement could be satisfied as
parties may be held liable for damages to natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C)
(1988).
48 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
916 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1990).
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obligated to pay damages.5 0 Accordingly, since a PRP letter itself
cannot cause an insured to become legally obligated, it lacks "the
attributes of a 'suit'" and therefore did not trigger the duty to
defend.5 1 Significantly, however, the court stated in dicta that the
duty to defend would be triggered by not only a cost recovery ac-
tion,5 2 but also an action for injunctive relief53 or an administrative
proceeding.54
In Ryan, the First Circuit held that notice and requests for
cooperation sent by the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) did not constitute a suit triggering the duty to
defend. 5 Applying New York law,56 the court did, however, find
50 Detrex Chem., 681 F. Supp. at 445.
Id. at 446 ("[A] claim for damages made against [the insured] that might result in its
legal liability is not synonymous with a 'suit' so as to trigger [the insurer]'s duty to de-
fend .... " (emphasis added)).
52 Id. (indicating that duty to defend would be triggered by § 9607 cost recovery
action).
11 Id. ("Until, pursuant to [s]ection 9606, the EPA resorts to a court injunction or to a
mandatory court order to enforce a section 9606(a) administrative order,. .. a 'suit' would
not be brought against [the insured] that would trigger [the insurer]'s duty to defend."); see
also id. at 459-60 (asserting that duty to defend is triggered by "order directing compliance
with the request" for information and access from PRP, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5) (1988));
accord Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D.
Wash. 1990) (holding EPA administrative order constituted "suit").
" See Detrex Chem., 681 F. Supp. at 452-55. The court found that notice of a state
administrative proceeding would trigger the duty to defend where an agency was empowered
to hold a hearing, take evidence, and perform other traditional judicial activities, because
the agency would thus be acting in a judicial capacity. Id. at 454-55; cf. Colonial Tanning
Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 780 F. Supp. 906, 916-917 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (filing of formal ad-
ministrative complaint constitutes "suit").
55 See Ryan, 916 F.2d at 742-43. The court found it "simply too much of a stretch to
bind Royal by the CGL policy's duty-to-defend language to the acceptance of NYDEC's
implied invitation to voluntary action." Id. at 742. Furthermore, the court noted that "the
mere possibility of future litigation, indefinite and unfocused, cannot trigger the duty to
defend under a CGL policy." Id. at 743.
11 See id. at 736-37. While other courts applying New York law have addressed the
issue, the New York Court of Appeals has not directly considered whether a PRP letter is
sufficient to trigger the duty to defend. Id. at 737. The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, has held that an EPA PRP letter does not trigger the duty to defend. See Technicon
Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 105 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1988) ("The letter was an invitation to voluntary action on [the insured]'s part and is not
the equivalent of the commencement of a formal proceeding within the meaning of the sub-
ject [CGL] policies."), aff'd, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989). The Second Circuit, however, reached
the conclusion that a notice letter did trigger the duty to defend. See Avondale Indus., Inc.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Technicon because
instant case involved "demand" letter rather than "invitation"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906
(1990). More recently, the Appellate Division, Third Department, followed the Second De-
partment and held that a PRP letter did not trigger the duty to defend, since it requests
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the rule requiring a formal suit to be overly rigid. 7 In its place, the
court developed a four-part test to determine whether notice was
the functional equivalent of a suit by measuring the notice's "coer-
civeness [and] adversariness, [as well as] the seriousness of the ef-
fort with which the government hounds an insured, and the gravity
of imminent consequences. 5 8 After articulating the test, the Ryan
court found lacking the elements of coerciveness and a serious gov-
ernment effort because the DEC letter merely invited the insured
to participate in remedial efforts.59 Given the scope of the CER-
CLA scheme and the power of the federal government, ° it might
appear that an EPA PRP letter presumptively meets the Ryan
test; predictably, courts applying Ryan to an EPA notification
have split."'
voluntary action and fails to threaten present litigation. See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 577 N.Y.S.2d 953, 960 (App. Div., 3d Dep't), appeal denied, 600 N.E.2d
632 (1992).
M See Ryan, 916 F.2d at 739-41. While the court acknowledged that the requirement of
a formal suit is one method by which to protect the insurer against fraud, it questioned
whether such an inflexible standard unnecessarily limited the scope of coverage. Id. at 740
(While "requiring a suit... as [a condition] precedent" to the duty to defend may safeguard
the insurer, it may be "that so rigid a rule jettisons the baby with the bath water."). The
court observed that "a considerable part [of cleanup activities] may be spent prior to the
initiation of suit, for example, in negotiations or administrative hearings .... [and that]
hazardous waste liability does not always-or even often-hinge upon the filing of a formal
complaint in court." Id. at 741. The court thus concluded that, "[w]here pollution coverage
is concerned, there is precious little to commend an inflexible suit-cum-judgment rule as
opposed to a standard anchored in the probability that a potential liability will actually
materialize in the immediate future." Id. at 740.
58 Id. at 741.
11 Id. at 741-42.
1o See supra notes 11-19 (discussing CERCLA cleanup process); infra notes 77-80, 87-
91 (discussing EPA's coercive posture).
" Compare Professional Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 423, 428-31 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991) with City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co. of Wis., 493 N.W.2d 768, 775-
77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 479 N.W.2d 130 (Wis. 1993). In Professional
Rental, despite its recognition of EPA's "confrontational and seemingly coercive posture,"
the court found that a PRP letter was not the functional equivalent of a "suit" because the
PRP was "not force[dJ' to respond." 599 N.E.2d at 430 (emphasis in original). In contrast,
the Edgerton court concluded that an EPA PRP notification satisfied the Ryan test. 493
N.W.2d at 776-77 (noting "EPA['s] ... adversarial posture ... devastating financial conse-
quences ... government's coercive actions").
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II. PRO-INSURED CASES-DUTY TO DEFEND TRIGGERED BY PRP
LETTER
A. Alternate Clear and Unambiguous Analysis
The clear and unambiguous rules of policy construction will
not always yield a pro-insurer result,6 2 as illustrated by the ruling
in C.D. Spangler Construction Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft Engi-
neering Co..e3 Since the policy at issue did not define the term
"suit,"64 the court reasoned that it was free to assign "suit" its or-
dinary meaning.6 5 Despite noting many of the narrower definitions
used to support pro-insurer results,"6 the Spangler court adopted
the broader definition of "the attempt to gain an end by legal pro-
cess"6 7 and thus held that compliance orders of the state environ-
mental agency triggered the duty to defend. s Although other
courts have accepted the Spangler reasoning,69 the broad defini-
tion seems tenuous because, first, it goes against the weight of au-
thority,70 and second, it was arguably unnecessary to justify these
courts' holdings because the proceedings at issue were of an ad-
62 See supra notes 31-38 (discussing pro-insurer results based on narrow definition of
"suit").
63 388 S.E.2d 557, 570 (N.C. 1990) (finding ordinary meaning of "suit" to be broad and
holding duty to defend triggered by state compliance orders).
" Id. at 569.
85 Id. at 570 ("Thus we conclude ['suit'] is a nontechnical word and should be given
that meaning it has acquired in ordinary speech.").
:6 Compare id. (listing dictionary definitions) with supra note 31 (same).
67 Spangler, 388 S.E.2d at 570.
66 Id.
60 A.Y. MacDonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 627-28
(Iowa 1991); Coaldey v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 618 A.2d 777, 786-87 (N.H. 1992).
The MacDonald court, after reviewing various definitions, found the term "suit" to be am-
biguous and adopted the broader meaning. 475 N.W.2d at 627-28. Thus, the Iowa court held
that the EPA actions at issue, which included an administrative complaint and hearing re-
sulting in a consent decree, constituted a "suit" sufficient to trigger the duty to defend. Id.
at 629. Similarly, the court in Coakley deemed that the PRP notice had triggered a process
to ultimately determine liability. 618 A.2d at 786. The New Hampshire court likewise found
that the administrative order of the state agency initiated a sequence of events resulting in
legal liability. Id. at 787.
70 See MacDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 627. The definition upon which MacDonald relied is
a second entry in the dictionary in which it appeared. Id.; Spangler, 388 S.E.2d at 570.
Furthermore its "weight of authority" is minimal as it diverges from a multitude of other
dictionary definitions. See supra note 31. Lastly, as even one of the pro-insured courts ap-
pears to admit, application of the clear and unambiguous rule must yield a pro-insurer re-
sult. See Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 555 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Mass.
1990) ("Literally, there is no suit.").
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ministrative nature-indicated by some courts, even under a nar-
rower definition of the term "suit," to trigger the duty to defend.7 1
B. Results and Expectations from the Insured's Perspective
More often, pro-insured results are obtained through applica-
tion of the unreasonable results exception to the clear and unam-
biguous rule 2 and through the reasonable expectations doctrine.73
Under the former, a "clear and unambiguous" construction will not
control if it produces an unreasonable result in the context of the
surrounding circumstances. "4 The reasonable expectations test sim-
ilarly reflects surrounding circumstances by defining the policy lan-
guage as that which one in the insured's position would reasonably
have expected it to mean.7 5 The relevant circumstances of which a
court must take notice7 6 include the EPA/PRP relationship 7 in
71 See supra note 54 (discussing triggering of duty to defend by compliance order).
72 See supra note 29 (discussing abrogation of plain meaning where unreasonable result
obtains).
73 See WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.03, at 290 ("A growing number of courts have held, in
the context of interpreting insurance policies, that the insured's reasonable expectations
must be given effect."); 2 COUCH, supra note 7, § 15:16, at 174 ("[The construction adopted
is that which a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the
language to mean."). Judicial commentary on the increasing acceptance of the doctrine and
its underlying rationale includes the following:
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is rapidly becoming standard insurance
law. At least twenty states have adopted the rule of reasonable expectations ....
Scholars have embraced the doctrine as well .... Abundant policy reasons sup-
port the adoption of the doctrine of honoring reasonable expectations. First, insur-
ance policies are lengthy, complicated -documents, which frequently are not read
by the insured. Second, insurance policies are classic examples of adhesion con-
tracts, leaving the consumer with minimal bargaining power. Third, protecting
reasonable expectation frequently prevents an unconscionable result. Fourth, if
insurance is procured for a specific reason and the insurance company could rea-
sonably ascertain this reason, the expectations of the insured should be protected.
Nelson v. Becton, 929 F.2d 1287, 1293 (8th Cir. 1991) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
74 See 2 COUCH, supra note 7, § 15:10, at 151-52; WINDT, supra note 5, § 6.02, at 279-
80.
." See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1516 (9th Cir. 1991).
Under this doctrine, the focus is on the insured's understanding of the term at issue, so the
pertinent query in an environmental insurance case becomes whether the insured would
consider a PRP letter to be a suit. Id. The Pintlar court observed that "an ordinary PRP
would view a PRP notice as triggering the need to defend itself and as thus instituting a
'suit.' "Id. It may be asserted that the reasonable expectations of a large commercial insured
are less than those of an ordinary person. See supra note 30 (discussing "sophisticated poli-
cyholder" exception).
76 See, e.g., Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d at 1517 (noting PRP cooperation incentives and
CERCLA settlement goals); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., Civ. No.
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which the PRP "ha[s] no practical choice other than to [be]
respon[sive]. 17 ' Thus, some courts have held that a PRP letter
triggers the duty to defend because, first, the result compelled by a
"clear and unambiguous" construction is unrealistically narrow
given the strict nature of the CERCLA scheme, 7  and second, a
PRP, being aware of the EPA's powers under CERCLA, reasona-
bly treats PRP notification as the equivalent of a lawsuit.80
The unreasonable results concept is illustrated in American
Motorists Insurance Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc..s Taking no-
tice of the potential exposure created by CERCLA's joint and sev-
eral liability" and treble damages, the court concluded that ac-
cepting the insurer's argument that the term "suit" meant the
filing of a complaint would produce an "absurd" result.8 2
The pro-insured cases sometimes utilize an unannounced com-
bination of the two rationales to support their holdings. For exam-
88-1994, 1988 WL 112142, at *6 n.2 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) (recognizing CERCLA threat of
joint and several liability as compulsion to take action), vacated on other grounds, Civ. No.
88-1994 (D.N.J. June 27, 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1991); Hazen Paper v. United
States Fidelity & Guar., 555 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. 1990) (describing dangers of failing to
participate in cleanup); cf. Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 447 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (discussing analogous state hazardous waste cleanup regulation), rev'd on other
grounds, 476 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. 1991).
7 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (describing involvement and exposure
of PRP during CERCLA cleanup process).
78 Hazen Paper, 555 N.E.2d at 582. It is "an underlying principle [of CERCLA]... that
Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties." H.R.
REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837;
see also id. at 100, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2882 ("The Committee believes that
encouraging such negotiated cleanups will accelerate the rate of cleanup and reduce its ex-
pense by tapping the technical and financial resources of the private sector." (emphasis
added)).
Moreover, in a subsequent enforcement action, judicial review of EPA's conduct is lim-
ited to the administrative record established during the cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1)
(1988). One federal district court has recognized that this limitation compels early PRP
involvement as a protective measure as to subsequent proceedings and on that basis found a
PRP to be the equivalent of a "suit." Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United
States Fidelity & Guar., 775 F. Supp. 718, 733 (D. Vt. 1991).
78 See infra notes 81-82, 85-87 and accompanying text (noting cases finding unreasona-
ble results produced by "clear and unambiguous construction").
11 See Ryan, 916 F.2d at 741. If the government action meets the elements of the test,
"then the functional equivalent of a suit may be in progress and the insured might reasona-
bly expect the insurer to defend." Id. (emphasis added); infra notes 88-91 (discussing cases
relying on reasonable expectations of insured).
81 Civ. No. 88-1994, 1988 WL 112412 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), vacated on other grounds,
Civ. No. 88-1994 (D.N.J. June 27, 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1991).
82 Id. at *6.
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ple, nowhere in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pintlar Corp.83
does the court mention the unreasonable results or reasonable ex-
pectations doctrines.84 Nevertheless, taking notice of the CERCLA
scheme, 85 the court concluded that a PRP letter is "unlike the gar-
den variety demand letter," '86 and that it should thus trigger the
duty to defend.8 7 Additionally, the court acknowledged that, upon
receipt of a PRP letter, an "ordinary person" would expect a liabil-
ity insurer to provide a defense.88 This measuring of results and
expectations is also present in Hazen Paper v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty, 9 Polkow v. Citizens Insurance Co. of
America,9" as well as other pro-insured cases to a lesser degree.91
C. Overly Broad Approaches
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (Ex-
83 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991).
81 See id. at 1516-18. The only rule of policy construction to which the court refers is
the "plain meaning" rule. Id. at 1516.
85 See id. at 1516-17.
86 Id. at 1516.
87 See id. CERCLA's far-reaching liability, incentives for settlement, and immediate
effects on substantive rights compel the triggering of the duty to defend much earlier than
that for an ordinary demand. Id.
11 See id. at 1517 ("[A]n 'ordinary person' would believe that the receipt of a PRP
notice is the effective commencement of a 'suit' necessitating a legal defense.").
19 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990). The court recognized that while "[a] superficial view of
the [PRP] letter might lead one to conclude that it is not analogous to a complaint," id. at
580, "[i]t would be naive to characterize the EPA letter as a request for voluntary action."
Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added). Given the dangers present in ignoring a PRP letter, id. at
581, the court concluded that "the litigation defense protection... purchased [by the in-
sured] would be substantially compromised if [the insurer] had no obligation to defend ...
in response to the [PRP] letter." Id. at 580.
90 447 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 476 N.W.2d 383, 383
n.2 (Mich. 1991). As to the insured's state of mind, the court noted that "it is little wonder
that [PRPs] attempt to resolve allegations of contamination of the environment without
resorting to the courts." Id. at 856. The court found that it would be unreasonable not to
take a broad view of "suit," given the "administrative mechanisms" and potential exposure
to which the insured is subject. Id.; accord Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plat-
ing Co., 496 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
"I See Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir. 1989)
("common sense argues that for [the insurer] to proffer a defense now is better"), cert. de-
nied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Specialty Coatings, 535 N.E.2d
1071, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("threat of available formal legal action ... expected to motivate"
PRP to respond), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1989); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Ad-
miral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (treating PRP letter as suit since
cost recovery action is "inevitable") (dicta), review granted, No. S026013, 1992 Cal. LEXIS
2554 (Cal. May 21, 1992).
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Cell-O !),92 the court broadly defined "suit" as "any effort to im-
pose on the policyholders a liability ultimately enforced by a
court."93 Ex-Cell-O I supported its holding with the broad lan-
guage in United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 4
which indicated that the duty to defend would be triggered by any
type of government action.9 5 The language from Ex-Cell-O I has
been criticized,9" however, and rightly so, since "any effort" does
not incorporate the notion of a court proceeding,97 nor does "ulti-
mately enforce[able]" require imminent or immediate adversari-
ness.9 8 Finally, a number of courts have justified pro-insured re-
sults by considering the public interest in CERCLA enforcement.9
It may, however, be more appropriate in these disputes for courts
to limit themselves to the task of "determin[ing] the meaning of a
private contract between the[ ] parties."'100
92 685 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
93 Id. at 625.
336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. App. 1983).
95 See id. at 843. Although the governmental actions taken in this case would probably
fit within the standards set forth in other pro-insured cases and thus justify a broad reading
of "suit," the court proffered language that seems to obviate the need for any type of legal
process to trigger the duty to defend:
If the state were to sue in court to recover in traditional "damages," including the
state's costs incurred in cleaning up the contamination, for the injury to the
groundwater, [the insurer]'s obligation to defend against the lawsuit and to pay
damages would be clear. It is merely fortuitous ... that the state has chosen to
have [the insured] remedy the contamination problem, rather than choosing to
incur the costs of clean-up itself and then suing plaintiff to recover those costs.
Id.
96 See Central Quality Serv. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 87-CV-7443, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *21 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1989) (stating that Ex-Cell-O I does
"violence to the plain and ordinary meaning of suit"), afl'd, No. 90/1991, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27911 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992).
"' See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (noting commonly-held definitions of
"suit").
:8 See supra notes 55-59, 61 and accompanying text (describing Ryan test).
9' See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting "nation's best interests"); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 1200,
1206 (2d Cir. 1989) (acknowledging "public interest"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990);
Higgins Indus., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 774, 779 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
("[M]oney spent litigating duty to defend cases... would be better spent.., to clean up
the environment instead."). But see Arco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 69 n.4 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (rejecting insured's argument that policy language providing duty to defend
only "suits" was contrary to public policy).
100 Patrons Oxford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1990). The court
observed that it was not their job to either "foster or retard environmental goals." Id. The
EPA is in accord with this position. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (testimony of James
M. Strock, EPA) ("We view coverage issues as questions of private contract interpretation
governed by state law." (emphasis added)).
INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
Given the apparent merits of both the pro-insurer and pro-
insured positions, it seems unlikely that a resolution of the split
described in this Note is forthcoming. Not surprisingly, courts are
also split over whether non-environmental administrative proceed-
ings trigger the duty to defend. 101 Looking to the Supreme Court
for resolution of these issues is also likely to be futile since the
Court has routinely denied certiorari in environmental insurance
cases.
102
III. POLICY CONSIDERATION AND IMPLICATIONS
One might conclude that the determinative factor in deciding
whether a PRP letter triggers the duty to defend is whether the
insurers are seen as villains10 3 or victims.104 Recognizing CER-
101 See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188-89 (7th Cir.) (holding
General Services Administration compliance review does not trigger CGL duty to defend),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d
969, 970-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (finding EEOC proceedings do not trigger duty to
defend), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 (N.J. 1990). But see School Dist No. 1 v. Mission Ins.
Co., 650 P.2d 929, 937 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) ("We believe that the term 'suits' . . . is suffi-
ciently broad to cover administrative proceedings."); but cf. Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In holding the duty to defend was triggered by the pre-
suit settlement of a claim against the insured's homeowner's policy, the court observed that
"[t]he duty to defend, v~here it exists, exists at the pre-litigation, as well as litigation
stages." Id.
102 See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842
F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en bane) (cleanup costs as damages), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio),
aff'd without opinion, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1987) (pollution exclusion), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 817 (1989).
103 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139,
1173-74 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (criticizing insurers). After acknowledging the splits in authority
on environmental insurance issues, Judge Enslen took issue with the insurers:
I do not think it wise or necessary that so much financial resources are spent
trying these duty to defend issues .... Insureds apparently must often seek insur-
ance just to cover the cost of litigating against their own insurance company! The
expenditure of such funds by the insured diminishes the amount available to actu-
ally clean up the environment and/or reimburse the government or private parties
for the costs of cleaning up the environment-assuming liability is found.
Id. Additionally, an antitrust action is currently pending in which nineteen states and nu-
merous private plaintiffs allege that insurers, reinsurers, and other members of the insur-
ance market conspired to restrict the availability of CGL coverage. See In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468-70 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (discussing background of suit),
rev'd on other grounds, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 125 L. Ed.
2d 612 (1993).
104 See Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Liability for CERCLA Cleanup Costs-Are
Insurers the Victims of Judicial Activism?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. RaV. 221, 221-36 (1991)
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CLA's current inefficiencies, 105 however, it seems that any policy-
based analysis of the duty to defend should turn on the remedial
potential of the chosen result. Despite the appeal of deep-pocketed
insurers being a required player in the CERCLA process, 08 it is
suggested that insurer involvement should be delayed until post-
cleanup cost recovery suits are initiated.
With CERCLA "already mired in litigation,' ' 07 one way to en-
hance its efficiency might be to remove the litigious insurers'0 8
from the cleanup process. In the short-term, cleanup would oper-
ate more efficiently due to the absence of diversionary and expen-
sive litigation, 1' 9 and cost recovery actions would be more effec-
tively" O resolved due to a narrowing of disputed issues."'
Furthermore, eliminating insurer involvement should produce
long-term benefits. First, shifting costs to the insurer-the current
(arguing that insurers are victims); see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 131 (statement of
Prof. Howard C. Kunreuther) (stating that current pro-insured judicial interpretation unan-
ticipated by insurance industry).
oI See Thomas A. Gordon, Practical and Economic Issues Related to Hazardous
Waste Cleanup and Insurance Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE: FROM INTERPRETA-
TION TO LITIGATION 285, 290-91 (1991). "[Tlhere are many critics who believe that the cur-
rent statutory scheme and the resulting insurance litigation are a time consuming, expensive
and inefficient method to clean up the country's environment." Id. at 290; see also OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE
SOLVED... 85 (1989) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN] (concluding that 50 to 70 percent of CER-
CLA spending is inefficient); RAND Report Details Superfund's Slow Progress, RISK MAN-
AGEMENT, Oct. 1989, at 75, 78 (discussing CERCLA progress and expenditures); DeBenedic-
tis, supra note 14, at 30 (same); Leslie Cheek III et al., Insurance Coverage for Superfund
Liability Defense and Cleanup Costs: The Need for a Nonlitigation Approach, 19 ENVrL.
L. REP. 10,203, 10,203 (1989) (same). Perhaps the greatest problem with CERCLA is that
too great a portion of funds has not been spent on cleanup. See COMING CLEAN, supra, at 28
(reporting that 60% of CERCLA expenditures were for non-cleanup expenses). Instead
funds are diverted to litigation expenses. See id. at 29 ("[A] significant portion of legal
spending is unnecessarily high or avoidable."); Cheek et al., supra, at 10,203 ("[fIt ...
cost[s] as much if not more to litigate the issues of liability and the nature of the remedy as
.. . to do the actual cleanup."). Insurance companies, albeit an unwilling player in the
cleanup process, spend more than three-quarters of their CERCLA expenditures on litiga-
tion costs. See DeBenedictis, supra note 14, at 30 ("88 percent is spent on litigating
claims").
106 See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir.
1991) (observing that insurer involvement is necessary ingredient in achievement of CER-
CLA goal of PRP cooperation).
107 RAND Report Details Superfund's Slow Progress, supra note 105, at 78.
"o See DeBenedictis, supra note 14, at 30.
109 See supra note 105 (discussing inefficient CERCLA litigation).
"o See RAND Report Details Superfund's Slow Progress, supra note 105, at 75
("Through September 1988 .... less than 10 percent of" all costs had been recovered.).
III See Hearings, supra note 1, at 101 (statement of John C. Butler, III) (observing that
high transaction costs, including litigation, are due in part to incomplete site data).
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practice-does not provide an incentive to polluters to modify fu-
ture conduct.112 Second, imposing the burdens of present defense
costs on the insurers will inhibit the evolution of pollution liability
insurance,113 as mandated by CERCLA.11 4 Accordingly, it is sub-
mitted that the benefits of involving insurers in the cleanup pro-
cess by triggering the duty to defend upon PRP notification are
outweighed by the overall negative impact on the environmental
cleanup scheme.
CONCLUSION
It would not be fair to conclude that either the pro-insurer
position or the pro-insured position is legally insufficient. If a court
chooses to apply the traditional clear and unambiguous rule of pol-
icy construction, its conclusion must be that the term "suit" means
a court proceeding. Therefore the duty to defend any "suit" cannot
be triggered by a mere PRP letter. On the other hand, if a court
decides to adopt the contemporary reasonable expectations doc-
trine, upon its taking notice of the EPA/PRP relationship the
court would naturally find a PRP letter to be the equivalent of a
suit. In addition, policy considerations present a difficult choice be-
tween drawing a deep-pocket insurer into the costly cleanup pro-
112 See Burkhalter, supra note 104, at 235.
"' See id. at 235-36. If insurers cannot properly conduct risk management as a result of
judicial decisions providing coverage unanticipated by the policies, the availability of future
coverage will be limited. Id.; see also Cheek et al., supra note 105, at 10,203 (discussing
problems associated with thwarting risk management). The availability of pollution liability
or environmental impairment insurance has been severely limited. See GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, LIABILITY INSURANCE: EFFECTS OF RECENT "CRISIS" ON BUSINESSES AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS 18-19 (1988) (reporting that many insurance buyers are unable to procure
environmental liability insurance); see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 255-66 (Environmen-
tal Liability Market Survey prepared by Johnson & Higgins) (showing only three companies
writing pollution liability insurance).
Although of greater concern with regard to related indemnification issues, see supra
note 4, the potential for insurance industry insolvency is another matter to be considered in
the analysis of current cost-shifting principles. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 131 (state-
ment of Prof. Howard C. Kunreuther) ("Superfund threatens to impose substantial burdens
on the insurance industry, possibly leading to insolvency of some companies and severely
disrupting the economy if insurers are held financially responsible for cleanup costs under
CGL policies."); see also id. at 9 (testimony of Peter Guerroro, GAO) (noting increased loss
ratio of CGL insurers due to environmental claims); id. at 90-93 (statement of Amy Bouska)
(remarking on implications of insurers' CERCLA liability). See generally id. at 164-79
(statement of Crum & Forster Ins. Cos.) (reporting on financial status of insurance industry
and possible effects of CERCLA liability). But see generally id. at 192-201 (statement of
Eugene R. Anderson, Esq.) (asserting that insurance industry exaggerates danger).
114 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-75 (1988) (pollution insurance).
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cess and the inefficiency resulting from the insurer's presence. Ulti-
mately, however, three pro-insurer arguments stand out. First,
forgetting the environment, the issue is plainly one of contractual
interpretation. Second, remembering the environment, prompt and
efficient cleanup, which does not occur when the insurers are in-
volved, should be the controlling consideration. Third, looking to
the future, the nation's industry will require some type of pollution
liability insurance, the evolution of which has been inhibited by
the overly-broad construction of CGL policies. Hence, the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term "suit" as some type of legal pro-
ceeding must prevail such that PRP notification, standing alone,
does not trigger the CGL insurer's duty to defend.
Paul V. Majkowski
